Joseph Hancock, Jr. was born on July 21, 1758 to <Edward J. (Joseph)> and Mary (Bush) Hancock in Bedford County Pennsylvania. The events of Joseph’s first seven years of life are unknown. The story begins with the history of the town of Hancock Maryland where Edward Hancock purchased property from William McClary sometime after 1765. (Hancock, Web) History indicates Joseph Hancock, Jr. operated a ferry for which a petition was requested in 1774 until enlisting in the Pennsylvania 8th Regiment of the Continental Line August 20, 1776. The ferry was known as Hancock’s Ferry. The Hancock property was sold in 1782 and became part of what was later known as Rowland’s Addition. The Hancock home was located east of the ferry, and the ferry west of a tract of land later known as William’s Town.

The historical perspective provided on the Hancock Maryland web site indicated that William Russell laid out the town along the main road from Fort Frederick to Fort Cumberland a short time before 1789. He called it William’s Town, for which no reason was given. Confusion existed for a number of years as the area was known as both William’s Town and Hancock’s Town. This confusion may have been due to two areas of development that were proximate but adjacent to each other until, for unknown reasons, William’s Town was dropped from any deeds written after 1810. Interestingly, a map Of North America published in 1771 for Carrington Bowles in London, shows a site on the “Powtomac” [sic] in the general area as “WilliamssFer” [sic]. Likewise, two other map sources, published before 1772, mark Williams Ferry, however, there were also several other ferries nearby, one of which was west but close to Williams Ferry. A map published in 1795 refers to the area as “Hancocks T.” the T. standing for “town”. The mixed naming of the town may be due to the two ferry names under Williams and Hancock. Whether Hancock bought out Williams or there were actually two ferries has yet to be determined. The Hancock web site further indicated the town was incorporated 1853, by an act of the Legislature, and that no other name was considered but Hancock. “Town” was dropped from the name.

It is known, through Joseph Hancock’s daughter Cynthia Reeder, that the Indians killed Joseph’s father Edward J. or Joseph Hancock, Sr. The year this happened and at what age has not been determined. The age of Joseph, Jr., when his father was killed, is also not known. Edward made the land purchase in 1765, at which time Joseph Jr. would have been approximately seven. It is therefore safe to assume that he was very aware of the circumstances surrounding his father’s untimely death. After his fathers death Joseph’s mother married Lewis Castleman. There were no children. According to family record, she lived to 106. The sale of the property owned by Edward J. Hancock in Hancock’s Town may have been associated with her remarriage and relocation to Pennsylvania. After the war Joseph Hancock Jr., the only child of Edward Joseph and Mary Hancock returned to the area and married Catherine Baltimore. Ten years after leaving the military he moved to Kentucky, the first of three locations in the west, and raised his family. He left no descendants in Hancock, Maryland or Pennsylvania.

“Powder was to be obtained, not from officers under the control of Congress, but from committees and other local powers, who had collected small parcels for local defense.  Arms, too, were deficient in number, and inferior in quality.  The troops were almost destitute of clothing, and without tents.  A siege (Boston, Massachusetts circa September 1774) was to be carried on without engineers and almost without entrenching tools.  In addition to these defects, many were discontented with the general officers appointed by Congress: and the mode of appointing regimental officers, in some of the colonies, where they were elected by the soldiers, was extremely unfavorable to discipline.  Yet under all these disadvantages, the General observed with pleasure, ‘the materials of a good army.’ There were ‘a great number of men, able-bodied, active, zealous in the cause, and of unquestionable courage.’ Possessed of these materials, he employed himself indefatigably in their organization.” 

Washington recognized the need immediately for a more established and disciplined military force establishing the Continental Army.  With battle experience, training and discipline, the Continental soldiers improved.  They became “professional” American soldiers.  State Militias, on the other hand, were often formed and disbanded in days or weeks, seldom disciplined, and generally untrained.  This is not to deny their importance in the war effort.  On the contrary, they provided essential support in many battles for without them, there would not have been sufficient numbers of soldiers to face the formidable British Army. 

The organization of States as sovereign entities voluntarily supporting the Union placed many political burdens on maintaining an effective continental fighting force, as stated by Marshall:   

“As the season for active operations approached, fresh difficulties, growing out of the organization of the American system, disclosed themselves.  Every state being exposed to invasion, the attention of each was directed to itself.  The spirit incident to every league was displayed in repeated attempts to give to military force such various directions as would leave it unable to affect any great object, or to obstruct any one plan the enemy might form.  The patriotism of the day, however, and the unexampled confidence placed in the commander-in-chief, prevented the mischief’s(sic) this spirit is well calculated to generate. His representations made their proper impression, and the intention of retaining continental troops for local defense was reluctantly abandoned.  The plan of raising additional regular corps, to be exclusively under state authority, was substituted for yeomanry of the country, as more effectual and convenient mode of protecting the coasts from insult.” 

Once the organizational problems were settled, food, clothing, blankets, and shoes became an immediate and continual problem.  Many men were forced to march barefooted.  Particularly bad in winter weather, the army often left a trail of blood in the snow.  Shelter for the rank and file was often non-existent.  They often slept unprotected in rain, and suffered the cold under the stars.  Disease was rampant, reducing the effective force more than causalities from battle.  Smallpox was particularly devastating, as well as forms of dysentery that could lead to death.  Conditions at Valley Forge, for example, were so bad that many accounts avoided the cruel reality of an army living in unimaginable squalor, unfit to defend itself against the British. Joseph and his compatriots were promised food and clothing as part of the compensation for joining.  Instead, they shared in mutual deprivation for their service. 

The Continental Congress had no taxing power and was left to pleading with the States to provide for the Continental Army and militias. Washington and his officers constant requests to Congress and State Legislators often went unfulfilled.  America and the respective states did not have an economy sufficient to support a war.   Soldiers were often not paid and, when they were, it was often in paper that rapidly depreciated. The parsimonious conduct of the various state congresses and treasuries was out of necessity.  The country borrowed heavily during the war.  Fortunately, for the outcome of the war, American allies provided cloth, arms and naval support at critical junctions in the long campaign.  The men suffered nonetheless.

The political realities of the time were as harsh as the military realities.  As a rule of thumb, one-third of the country opposed the war and separation with England, one-third favored independence, and one-third switched position with the ebb and flow of the war effort.   Thomas Paine, in Common Sense published in February 1776, stated that the most efficacious time was the present to fight the British.  He argued that after years of fighting in the French Indian war, Americans were armed, many had seen military action, and military officers with experience were available.  These conditions would not continue to exist indefinitely.  Common Sense was widely read, providing a needed stimulant and justification to pursue the war for independence.  Therefore those that sought America independence went to war with colonial citizens divided in their support. 

It should be noted however that the French Indian War was much different than fighting an established army like the British. Guerrilla tactics that often favored the use of the long rifle, preferred for its utility in hunting as well as warfare, were utilized.  The use of rifles against a large and organized British force was another matter.  These rifles could not mount bayonets and took five times as long to reload as the muskets in use at the time.  Special rifle companies, regiments, and brigades were formed and used for special purposes; they were highly feared by the British, but muskets were far more useful with forces facing each other in the conventional battle formations that often ended in hand-to-hand combat.  Few muskets were available at the beginning of the war.  

The British Army was the most powerful and disciplined army since the Roman legions.  Washington knew that he could not lose his army and often made battle decisions that would preserve it.  Accordingly the battle outcomes were often judged to not have been in his favor.  As will be discussed later, he allowed the British to occupy Philadelphia in order to save his army and an important store of ordnance and iron works.  Although he made a number of brilliant moves, such as the Christmas attack on Trenton, he fought a war largely of attrition.  The cost of the war was enormous for the British.  It was, from an English citizen’s point of view, distant, and not as important as continuing conflicts with France and Spain on the mainland. The British public eventually became weary of the war with the colonies and more concerned about their own backyard.  Washington had only to wait for an appropriate opportunity to execute a decisive victory.  When he achieved it at Yorktown with the help of the French Army and Navy, the British surrendered.  After Yorktown, the British recognition of America as an independent and sovereign nation took lengthy negotiations, but was eventually accomplished with no further military confrontations except on the frontier.  The British remained in control of such places as Detroit and from there encouraged Indians to keep up the hostilities.  After Yorktown the frontier continued to be at war. 

The Indians in the western frontier were encouraged by the British to attack the Americans, which initially gave rise to the Pennsylvania 8th Regiment.  Indians were often recruited as warrior soldiers and fought with the British.  Many Indians were sympathetic to the British, because they appeared to be a superior adversary after having won the French Indian War. Moreover, Indians believed they would receive better treatment from the British than from Americans, who were more land acquisitive.  In short, the Indians wanted the British to win because it would improve the probability of protecting their lands from settlement.  

The greatest deficiency of the American economy at the time was a shortage of labor to build and produce.  Diverting labor to military service took manpower away from a farm production economy.  Much of the instability of the various militias that were formed was based on the need for the men to return home to plant and harvest their crops, or take care of pressing family material needs.  The economic impact of war greatly disturbed the successful operation of family enterprises.  Essential manufactured goods were no longer available from Britain.  In the short run, without manufactured goods, many were hobbled in their daily pursuits and moreover believed it unlikely in the long run that a confrontation with the British would yield favorable results.

No matter how fragile the conditions were, America had a cause and a purpose that seemed to manifest itself as the revolution progressed.  The founding fathers were able to put substance to long-debated political and philosophical issues.  No republic the size of America had ever been established.  The most instructive attempts had been Greek city-states.  No one was entirely sure whether a republic would work on the scale that would be required in America.  But these concerns, although actively debated, were put aside to first establish that the citizens of this country had certain inalienable rights that were being denied by unenlightened British policy.  Although reconciliation with Britain was sought, it eventually became apparent that there was no choice but to seek independence.  Unlike many revolutions that were lead by thugs, America’s was unique for its exceptional if not divinely inspired leadership.  The founding fathers were a unique breed of men.  So were their military officers.

The 8th Regiment assembled in Kittanning, Pennsylvania during the fall of 1776. Orders were issued November 22, 1776 and received by the 8th Regiment December 4, 1776.  These orders officially made the 8th Pennsylvania Regiment part of the Continental Army.  Shockingly, they were not directed to proceed against the Indian enemy that was an immediate threat to the settlers.  Instead, they were ordered to find and join Washington�s army. The orders were not well received by an outfit that was undisciplined and committed to frontier causes. Nonetheless, they were forced to march six weeks in winter weather to link up with Washington.  Lt. Col. George Wilson wrote the following to a member of the Continental Congress, Col. James Wilson, on December 5th expressing his willingness to comply with the order:

The 8th Regiment joined Washington at Quibbletown, now known as New Market, New Jersey.� The march began January 6, 1777.� During this arduous six-week march that started with 684 men, 36 were captured, 14 were missing, 15 were dead, 15 were discharged, and 126 deserted.� Although these were the recorded figures, Washington�s letters state a different view.� At the time, Washington was convinced the Pennsylvania Colonels pocketed bounty money and listed men that had never enlisted as deserters.� Washington did not believe bounties were a way to raise an army.� He preferred a draft for which the Tory, timid, or wealthy could hire substitutes.� To improve the quality of commissioned officers, he insisted they be �gentlemen� in an aristocratic sense.� Washington would later hold the 8th Regiment in the highest regard for its bravery and fighting ability.

Whether corrupt or not, the conditions were severe and contributed to the death of the Commanding Officer, Colonel Mackey, February 14, 1777.� Lieutenant Colonel George Wilson, who prophetically predicted the outcome, also died in February.� A new command structure was not fully in place until June 9, 1777.� The 8th Regiment, with the exception of three rifle companies detached to Daniel Morgan, was placed under the new command of Brigadier General Anthony Wayne.���

Anthony Wayne was promoted to Brigadier General on February 21, 1777.� He had been in command of the garrison at Fort Ticonderoga and became weary of the relative inactivity of the command.� He desired to be under the direct command of Washington and after asking for a transfer, was ordered by Washington to join him in Morristown.� Wayne was at once placed in command of the Pennsylvania Line effective April 12, 1777.� Based on the size of the division, which was re-reorganized into a force of approximately 1700 men, Wayne should have been commissioned a Major General.� There were two Major Generals the allotted number from Pennsylvania.� Apparently, neither Mifflin nor St. Clair were considered for the position.� St. Clair succeeded Wayne at the garrison at Fort Ticonderoga, and Mifflin became Quarter Master General.� Wayne was a Brigadier General when he joined Washington�s army and remained such for the duration of the war.� During this time he had independent command with all the burdens associated with administration of the division, but never complained, although friends suggested he write to request a proper commission.� He does not appear to have done so.�

�General Wayne was said to have had a very enthusiastic personality and a pleasant demeanor.� He was aggressive, and a great tactician in military planning.� He was able to read battle engagements instantly and deploy his troops often in counter attack against the enemy.� He succeeded in planning the capture of enemy positions thought by other officers to be near impossible.� Washington usually included Wayne in his war councils and sought him out for advice even though he was not officially part of Washington�s immediate staff and of sufficient rank.� Washington respected Wayne�s instinct, wit, aggressiveness, and tactical ability.� He could always count on Wayne to provide an ambitious military option.� Although Washington was not always willing to take Wayne�s advice, he recognized Wayne as an exceptional leader and ordered him to spearhead or lead imperative deployments during the war.� The Pennsylvania Line attained an elite reputation as Wayne led them into successful enemy engagements throughout the war.� Joseph Hancock served under Wayne until detached to the frontier May 1778.

�Joseph had no choice but to accept the decisions of superiors that marched him off to a different war than that for which he enlisted, although he would in the end serve on the frontier fighting Indians.� At the start of his enlistment he was a member of a highly undisciplined army, marched unmercifully through the harsh winter in January and February of 1777.�� Unlike many others he did not allow the tribulations and disaffections to motivate him to desert or become insubordinate.� Given what he encountered, he would have had to be an exceptionally hardy, strong, clever, disciplined, and committed person to have survived.� The character of the man that emerged during this period persisted as he married, pressed west, again fought the Indians, acquired land, farmed, and raised a large family.� Joseph Hancock was a man who did great service for his country, enabled his own prosperity and secured the well-being of future generations so they could also live a remarkable and prosperous life.� In a country with a population of less than three million people at the end War, he can be included as one of the bricklayers for the foundation of this great country.�

Washington had secured the high ground in Morristown, New Jersey to hold defensive positions after driving Howe’s superior force back into New Brunswick and Amboy after winning battles at Trenton and Princeton.   Washington stood at the right flank of the enemy’s position and, unless Washington was dislodged, Howe’s army could not move towards Philadelphia without great risk.  Howe was forced to withdraw from advanced positions, as Marshall’s detailed review of the circumstance will reveal:

Washington charged Wayne with the task of preventing Howe from joining up with Burgoyne in the Hill Country of the Hudson.  If Howe join Burgoyne, the Colonies would have been split and severely weakened.  Washington needed a leader to cover the territory between the Delaware and West Point.  “A general of extraordinary activity and intelligence was needed, in command of troops of such spirit and discipline as to be able to move at a moment’s warning” according to Stille.  General Washington’s choice was Wayne and the troops in the Pennsylvania Line under Wayne’s command.

Consequently, the Pennsylvania troops were engaged in a number of conflicts, harassing the British to keep Howe contained in Amboy.  There was action in Quibbbletown (New Market) New Jersey, January 24, 1777.  Pennsylvania troops were active at Ashswamp in early February.  Family records indicate that Joseph Hancock was at this conflict.  Trussell’s compilation of the records does not indicate this.  In Trussell’s account, Patton’s regiment was the only Pennsylvania detachment recorded in this area. Prior to or during the British buildup at Brunswick Joseph Hancock received a musket ball in the right shoulder during an attack on Sir Henry Clinton’s regiment guard on March 16, 1777.  His recovery period is unknown.  There is no indication in Trussell’s accumulation of detailed injury records of a March injury.  This perhaps is further evidence that the record keeping was very loose or not preserved and accordingly, was often inaccurate. The 8th Regiment was surprised and somewhat battered by the British near Boundbrook on April 12, 1777.  The following is a list of confrontations in which the Pennsylvania Line engaged prior to Howe taking to sea:

Quibbletown, NJ January 24, 1777 - Ash Swamp, NJ February 1777 - Boundbrook, NJ April 12/13, 1777 - Bonhamtown, NJ April 15, 1777 - Piscataway, NJ April 21, 1777 - Amboy, NJ April 25, 1777 - Piscataway, NJ May 8 - Piscataway, NJ May 10, 1777 - Metuchen, NJ May 17, 1777 - Middletown, NJ May 26 & 27, 1777 - Somerset Court House, NJ June 14, 1777 - New Brunswick, NJ, June 22, 1777 - Short Hills, NJ June 26, 1777       

The Pennsylvania line began to acquire an excellent combat reputation.  Stille provides a brief account of a Battle at Brunswick on May 2, 1777: